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Article

Whither Wagner? Reconsidering Labor
Law and Policy Reform
Sara Slinn

†

INTRODUCTION
It is an interesting moment to contemplate the future of
North American labor law and labor relations. Canada and the
United States initially adopted similar labor relations legal
frameworks, the Canadian framework a variation of the United
States’ 1935 National Labor Relations Act (generally referred
1
to as the “Wagner Act” or the “Wagner model”). However, the
Wagner model has played out very differently in the two countries. A key indicator of this difference is the divergent trajectories of changing union density over the last sixty years in Canada and the United States. In contrast with the severe,
sustained decline in unionization in the United States, Canada
experienced a longer period of growth, slower decline, and—in
2
recent decades—a fairly stable level of unionization. Will the
labor relations experiences of these closely linked nations continue to diverge, or will Canada’s labor relations landscape
come to resemble that of the United States, and what might be
the implications for labor law?
In addressing this question, this Article proceeds in six
Parts. Part I briefly introduces the interconnected origins of
United States and Canadian labor law frameworks. Part II
surveys the unionization experience, and reviews possible explanations for the persistent and growing divergence in union
† Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The
author thanks the Symposium organizers, Minnesota Law Review editors, and
the archives at the University of Toronto Centre for Industrial Relations &
Human Resources, Newman Library, for their valuable assistance with this
Article. Copyright © 2014 by Sara Slinn.
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
2. See generally Jeffrey Sack, U.S. and Canadian Labour Law: Significant Distinctions, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241 (2010).
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density between the two countries. Part III introduces two alternative, but related, perspectives for explaining the different
labor relations experiences of the United States and Canada,
offering insights into their likely futures. These are John Godard’s “Historical-Institutionalist” perspective, and Harry Ar3
thurs’ “Real Constitution.”
Focusing on challenges to union security arrangements,
Part IV introduces relevant aspects of the Canadian labor relations system and considers why past efforts to introduce right4
to-work (RTW) legislation have failed. Part V provides an
overview of significant contemporary changes directly affecting
labor relations. These include: wide-ranging efforts by right-ofcenter parties to achieve anti-labor legislative changes directed
at financially undermining unions, restricting unions’ political
voice, and promoting right-to-work legislation. Part V also considers the labor movements’ recent countervailing efforts, including: union mergers, using broader community groups to
amplify unions’ political voice, and strategic voting.
Part VI concludes by considering whether the HistoricalInstitutionalist or Real Constitution perspectives are likely to
be borne out in the context of contemporary events, and, specifically, whether these attempts are likely to succeed. In short,
despite the greater protection offered by Canada’s juridical constitution, the question remains whether its “real” constitution
has undergone greater, countervailing change reflecting a fundamental shift in the nation’s norms and values such that labor
law will follow.
I. ORIGINS
Development of labor law in Canada has been indirectly
th
and directly influenced by the United States since the early 20
century. Indirect influences include those of U.S. corporations
and U.S.-headquartered unions (“international unions”) operat-

3. Harry W. Arthurs, Labour and the “Real” Constitution, 48 LES CADROIT 43 (2007) [hereinafter Arthurs, Real Constitution]; John Godard, Labour Law and Union Recognition in Canada: A HistoricalInstitutionalist Perspective, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 391 (2013) [hereinafter Godard,
Historical-Institutionalist].
4. This Article employs a broad understanding of RTW, including challenges to union membership and dues payment protections, as well as requirements for union financial disclosure focusing on the purposes of unions’
expenditures and time spent on matters other than collective bargaining.
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ing in Canada and affecting the structures, institutions and
5
practices of labor relations and the labor movement.
The most important direct form of United States influence
on developing Canadian labor law arose from efforts of Canadian unions with links to U.S.-headquartered “international unions” to pressure the federal and provincial governments to
adopt labor legislation similar to the Wagner Act. As a result of
the numerous international unions operating in Canada, Canadian unions and the peak labor organizations (the Canada
Congress of Labour (CCL) and the Trades and Labour Congress
(TLC)), were acutely aware of the advantages the Wagner Act
6
had brought to union organizing in the United States. In the
late 1930s, several provinces responded to this pressure by enacting labor legislation, which appeared to have been derived in
whole or in part from a model labor law bill the TLC had draft7
ed and submitted to provincial governments.
The federal government continued to resist intervening in
labor relations with statutory regulation, which it regarded as
an essentially private matter, and sought to maintain what it
8
regarded as a neutral stance toward labor relations. However,
growing labor militancy, the rapid and growing political success
of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation party (CCF)
which had strong ties to the labor movement, and wartime demands prompted two provincial governments and, shortly
thereafter, the federal government to adopt versions of the
9
Wagner Act. The federal legislation, Privy Council Order 1003
(PC 1003), passed in 1944, effectively became the template for
10
post-war labor legislation across Canada. As Mark Thompson
has pointed out, neither at the time PC 1003 was passed, nor in
the 1960s and 1970s when labor legislation in Canada was

5. See H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO
L.J. 1, 35 (1996).
6. H.A. LOGAN, STATE INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 1943–1954, at 9–10 (1956); Laurel
Sefton MacDowell, The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two, 3 LAB./LE TRAVAIL 175, 180 (1978).
7. JAMES C. CAMERON & F.J.L. YOUNG, THE STATUS OF TRADE UNIONS
IN CANADA 56 (1960); LOGAN, supra note 6, at 414–18.
8. MacDowell, supra note 6, at 180.
9. Id. at 189–90.
10. Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, Dominion Order-in-Council,
P.C. 1003 (Feb. 17, 1944) (Can.).
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modernized, was any serious consideration given to alterna11
tives to the Wagner model.
The motivations for adopting the Wagner model differed
between the two countries. In the United States the Wagner
model was framed as an economic tool to relieve the effects of
the Great Depression, while Canadian governments adopted
this model as means of securing industrial stability and order
12
during wartime and in the post-war period.
II. DIVERGING UNIONIZATION EXPERIENCES
The development of union density followed similar paths in
the United States and Canada between 1920 and 1965, after
which point the experiences of the two countries abruptly di13
verged.
A. DIVERGING UNIONIZATION EXPERIENCES
Between 1920 and the mid 1930s unionization in both nations was in the low to middle teens, with Canadian unionization rates tending to be one or two percent higher than that in
the United States. The density decline in the 1920s reached its
nadir with the Great Depression, followed by moderate growth
during the early 1930s. Beginning in 1935, the year the Wagner Act was passed, unionization steeply increased in both the
United States and Canada. This trend continued to the early
1950s, at which point union density in the United States was at
31.7% and at 28.4% in Canada. Unionization then declined
slightly in both countries until the early 1960s. At this point,
and thereafter, union density in Canada and the United States
has been on starkly diverging trajectories. Unionization has
sharply declined in the United States, while in Canada union
11. Mark Thompson, Wagnerism in Canada: Compared to What?, in PROXXXIST CONFERENCE 59, 61–63 (Anthony Giles et al. eds.,
1995).
12. See Godard, Historical-Institutionalist, supra note 3, at 400–02 (citing
Bruce E. Kaufman, Why the Wagner Act? Re-establishing Contact with Its
Original Purpose, in 7 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 15
(David Lewin et al. eds., 1996)); Daphne Gottlieb Taras, Collective Bargaining
Regulation in Canada and the United States: Divergent Cultures, Divergent
Outcomes, in GOVERNMENT IN REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 295, 300 (Bruce Kaufman ed., 1997).
13. W. Craig Riddell, Unionization in Canada and the United States: A
Tale of Two Countries, in SMALL DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER: LABOR MARKETS AND INCOME MAINTENANCE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 109,
109–14 & tbl.4.1, fig.4.1 (David Card & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1993).
CEEDINGS OF THE
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density grew until the mid-1980s. The United States has continued to experience a steep decline to the present time, while
the Canadian experience has been of moderate decline and
14
stagnation.
Union membership of paid, non-agricultural workers
reached peak density in Canada of 38.1% in 1985, while in the
15
United States it had peaked at 31.8% in 1955. Although the
overall trend, post-peak, has been declining union density, the
trajectories in the two countries have been very different.
In recent decades, the Canadian experience has been one of
stagnation in union density, in contrast to the steep and sustained decline seen in the United States. Current differences in
unionization between the two countries are stark. In 2013,
31.2% of all Canadian employees, including 74.6% in the public
sector and 17.5% in the private sector, were covered by a collec16
tive agreement. In contrast, 2013 data for the United States
indicate that, among employed wage and salary workers, 12.4%
were represented by unions, with 7.5% of private sector work17
ers and 38.7% of public sector workers represented by unions.
B. EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE
A substantial body of research has sought to explain the
diverging courses of unionization in the United States and
18
Canada. Most empirical studies indicate that the relatively
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also John Godard, Do Labor Laws Matter? The Density Decline
and Convergence Thesis Revisited, 42 INDUS. REL. 458, 461–64 (2003) [hereinafter Godard, Do Labor Laws Matter?] (regarding the variety of measures of
union density and difficulties involved in consistently measuring and comparing this phenomenon).
16. Calculations of union coverage based on STATISTICS CANADA, LABOUR
FORCE SURVEY ESTIMATES: TABLE 282-0078, Labour Force Survey Estimates
(LFS), Employees by Union Coverage, North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS), Sex and Age Group, Annual (Persons). Note that “union coverage” includes both employees who are members of a union and employees
who are not union members but who are covered by a collective agreement.
See id. Due to the prevalence of agency shop arrangements in Canada (discussed infra) under which union membership is not required, collective
agreement coverage is a more meaningful statistic than union membership.
Also note these figures include agricultural workers. See id.
17. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union
Members—2013, tbls.1–3 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.bls
.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. Note that these figures include agricultural
workers. See id.
18. See, e.g., Sara Slinn & Richard W. Hurd, Canada and US Labor Relations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
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lower union density in the United States is a product of lack of
access to unionization rather than a result of lower demand for
19
union representation. Many of these studies conclude that the
level of worker demand for union representation in the United
States is similar to, perhaps even greater than, that among
20
Canadian workers, and that density in the two countries
would be similar if U.S. workers’ desire for unionization was
21
satisfied.
Explanations for this divergence point to a wide range of
factors including differences in political, governmental, and
administrative environments; and differing managerial and la22
bor strategies. Some commentators identify Canadian labor’s
participation in federal and provincial social democratic parties, and the consequent political influence labor has enjoyed,
with the development of a more labor-friendly legislative and
23
policy environment.
In addition, stronger labor laws in Canada, relative to the
United States, are commonly identified among the key explanations for the dramatic decline in U.S. union density and the
153 (M. Barry & A. Wilkinson eds., 2000); John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 82 (2009);
Riddell, supra note 13; Daphne G. Taras, Explaining Canadian-American Differences in Union Density, IRRA 53RD ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 153 (2001); Leo
Troy, U.S. and Canadian Industrial Relations: Convergent or Divergent?, 39
INDUS. REL. 695 (2000).
19. But see, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the Private Sector, 1973–1998, 22 J. LAB. RES. 459 (2001)
(identifying declining demand for union representation among U.S. workers as
a significant explanation for falling U.S. union density).
20. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS
WANT (1999); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN
UNIONISM: WHY AMERICANS LIKE UNIONS MORE THAN CANADIANS DO, BUT
JOIN MUCH LESS (2004); Seymour Martin Lipset & Noah M. Meltz, Canadian
and American Attitudes Toward Work and Institutions, 1 PERSP. ON WORK 14,
14–19 (1998); Rafael Gomez et al., Frustrated Demand for Unionisation: The
Case of the United States and Canada Revisited (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/DP0492.pdf.
21. See generally Gomez et al., supra note 20, at 8 (concluding that this
unsatisfied demand for union representation accounted for about two-thirds of
the Canada-U.S. difference in union density in the 1990s and that union density in the United States would have been twenty-three percentage points
higher had this unmet demand been satisfied).
22. See Slinn & Hurd, supra note 18.
23. DONALD D. CARTER, LABOUR LAW REFORM: RADICAL DEPARTURE OF
NATURAL EVOLUTION?, INDUS. REL. CENTRE PRESS CURRENT ISSUES SERIES
3–4 (1992), available at http://irc.queensu.ca/sites/default/files/articles/carter
-labour-law-reform-radical-departure-or-natural-evolution.pdf; Sack, supra
note 2, at 244–47.
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persistent Canada-United States density difference. Labor
law is primarily a provincial responsibility under the Canadian
Constitution. Consequently, the federal government has jurisdiction over labor and employment relations only for employees
of the government, Crown corporations, and specified, federally-regulated industries. This diversity of regulation, together
with the Parliamentary system of government, is credited with
25
fostering a diversity of frequently changing labor law regimes.
C. THE CHARTER CONTRIBUTION TO THE DIVERGENCE
Recently, application of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (Charter), adopted in 1982, has emerged as perhaps the most distinct legal difference between the United
26
States and Canada. The Charter constitutionally guarantees
specific rights and freedoms including, most relevant to labor,
27
the freedoms of association (FOA) and expression. However,
these are not absolute guarantees. Section 1 of the Charter
provides that rights and freedoms are “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justi28
fied in a free and democratic society.”
During the first twenty-five years of the Charter’s life it
provided little protection to labor. Notably, the Canadian Labour Congress had opted out of participating in development of
the Charter, and did not seek to have labor rights entrenched

24. See, e.g., RICHARD N. BLOCK ET AL., LABOR STANDARDS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA (2003); Richard N. Block, Reforming U.S. Labor Law and
Collective Bargaining: Some Proposals Based on the Canadian System, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 250, 255 (Sheldon Friedman
et al. eds., 1994); Godard, Do Labor Laws Matter?, supra note 15. For a recent
survey of relevant legal differences, see Sack, supra note 2.
25. See Paul C. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty,
23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 26, 31 (1986). But see, e.g., Kevin M. Burkett, The Politicization of the Ontario Labour Relations Framework in the 1990s, CAN. LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 161, 162–63 (1998) (identifying these features as fostering partisan and extreme changes rather than constructive evolution of labor law). Arthurs, discussed further below, contends that provincial supremacy over labor
law has led to subordination of labor relations to trade and economic issues.
Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 62.
26. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 §§ 1, 2(d)
(U.K.).
27. This Article focuses on FOA rather than the freedom of expression.
28. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 § 1 (U.K.).

1812

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1805

29

in the Charter. Indeed, with the exception of mobility rights,
30
the Charter includes no labor or social rights.
In 1987 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) issued a “Labour Trilogy” of concurrent decisions, holding that the scope of
the Charter’s FOA guarantee did not include collective bargain31
ing or strike activity. However, in its 2007 Health Services decision the SCC expressly rejected the reasoning in the Labour
32
Trilogy, explicitly overturning its interpretation of the FOA.
Instead, the SCC declared that the FOA provides limited protection for the process of good faith collective bargaining. The
SCC also indicated that labor policy was no longer to be treated
as a judicial “no go” zone; that courts would no longer broadly
defer to legislatures in labor matters; and that the Charter
should, at a minimum, provide the level of protection found in
international human rights instruments that Canada has rati33
fied or to which Canada is a party.
The SCC revisited the Charter FOA shortly thereafter in
34
its 2011 Fraser decision. Although the majority opinion in

29. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 45–46. Larry Savage
characterizes this as a strategic choice to avoid conflict with labor supporters
in the New Democratic Party and in the Quebec Federation of Labour (the
FTQ), reflecting the fragmented nature of the Canadian labor movement and
social democratic politics. Larry Savage, Disorganized Labour: Canadian Unions and the Constitution Act, 36 INT’L J. CAN. STUD. 145, 155–56 (2007). Arthurs surveys a variety of other explanations. The Canadian Labour Congress
is the central labor organization in English Canada, established by the 1956
merger of the Trades and Labour Congress and the Canadian Congress of Labour.
30. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 §§ 1, 2(d)
(U.K.); see also Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 45–46. Larry Savage characterizes this as a strategic choice to avoid conflict with labor supporters in the New Democratic Party and in the Québec Federation of Labour
(FTQ), reflecting the fragmented nature of the Canadian labor movement and
social democratic politics. Savage, supra note 2, at 155–56.
31. The Labour Trilogy consists of: In re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.); P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 424 (Can.); R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (Can.).
The Supreme Court affirmed this position in Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R.
367 (Can.), and in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R.
989 (Can.).
32. Health Services & Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v.
British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, para. 26 (Can.).
33. Id. at paras. 26, 70, 79.
34. See Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
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Fraser professed to uphold Health Services, subsequent interpretation and application of Fraser has reflected a more restricted view of Charter FOA protection for collective bargain36
ing.
Health Services was greeted in some quarters as a triumph
37
for labor, and produced a surge of Charter litigation. Although
unions’ turn towards litigation has been most marked since this
decision, some commentators regard it as part of a broader
strategic shift by unions towards using domestic and international litigation as an alternative to pursuing political and legislative change to combat legislative incursions on collective
bargaining by governments that were increasingly hostile to
38
labor. This litigation strategy was common in the 1980s and
early 1990s, although unions’ interest in litigation had faded by
39
the mid-1990s with consistently disappointing SCC decisions.
III. ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES: THE HISTORICALINSTITUTIONALIST AND “REAL” CONSTITUTION
MODELS
Another stream of literature fundamentally disagrees with
the previously described explanations for the United StatesCanada unionization difference. Although allowing that these
other explanatory factors exist and may have some effect, these
authors regard those factors as products of more fundamental,
35. Id. at para. 97 (“Health Services is grounded in precedent, consistent
with Canadian values, consistent with Canada’s international commitments
and consistent [with the] Court’s purposive and generous interpretation of
other Charter guarantees. In [the SCC’s] view, [Health Services] should not be
overturned.”).
36. See, e.g., Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, [2010]
S.K.C.A. 27 (Can. Sask. C.A.), leave to app. granted; Ass’n of Justice Counsel v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2012] O.N.C.A. 530 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 430 (Can.); Mounted Police Ass’n of Ontario v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2010] O.N.C.A. 635 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal granted [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 350 (Can.).
37. See generally Brian Etherington, The B.C. Health Services and Support Decision—The Constitutionalization of a Right to Bargain Collectively in
Canada: Where Did It Come From and Where Will It Lead?, 30 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 715, 721–22 (2009) [hereinafter Etherington, Health Services]; John
P. McEvoy, B.C. Health Services: The Legacy After 18 Months, 59 U.N.B. L.J.
48, 50–58 (2009) (detailing various instances of Charter litigation).
38. Etherington, Health Services, supra note 37, at 721–22 (citing Judy
Fudge, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively:
The Implications of the Health Services and Support Case in Canada and Beyond, 37 INDUS. L.J. 25, 25–27 (2008)).
39. Id.
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“real,” cultural, historical or institutional differences between
the two countries. Two key examples of such alternative approaches are John Godard’s Historical-Institutionalist perspective and Harry Arthurs’ analysis of the “Real” constitution.
A. THE HISTORICAL-INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL
John Godard advocates a Historical-Institutionalist perspective, which looks to norms that have become entrenched in
40
institutions through a nation’s particular formative history.
These norms become structurally embedded in institutions and
power structures and cognitively embedded in how actors re41
gard institutions. This, in turn, leads to institutionalized dif42
ferences in the law.
Godard identifies the significant historical-institutional
differences between the United States and Canada as the essential reason for the countries’ different unionization experi43
ences. Godard explains that the history of the United States
reflects a highly-individualistic frontier experience, giving rise
to norms focusing on property rights, freedom of contract, mar44
ket rights, and distrust of state authority or intervention.
This, in turn, gave rise to a weak and conservative working
class, conservative labor movement, general suspicion of “big
45
labor,” and fierce employer anti-unionism. In contrast, Canada’s formative historical experience was marked by Upper
Canada elites’ concern for preserving order and stability, development led by the fur trade, smaller companies, and the Royal
Northwest Mounted Police, rather than the entrepreneurial
capitalist influence in the US; and, at least in Québec, the collectivist rather than individualist influence of the Roman Cath46
olic Church. Consequently, Canadian norms included greater
acceptance of an administrative and interventionist state, valuing maintenance of the status quo, and social democratic and
47
collectivist views. Godard suggests that the institutional
norms and traditions that developed in Canada are more consonant with the Wagner model than those of the United States,
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Godard, Historical-Institutionalist, supra note 3, at 393–94.
Id. at 394 n.9.
Id. at 393, 399–401.
Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 394–95.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 397–98.
Id.
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producing a more enduring labor relations system and support48
ing higher union density.
However, Godard recognizes that these distinct institutions have been eroded, pointing to ongoing changes in Canadi49
an political economy. Looking ahead, Godard contends that
current government attacks on labor will only have permanent
implications if governments hostile to labor and the norms underlying Canada’s labor relations system succeed in eroding
these norms and replacing them with new beliefs, values and
50
principles. Otherwise, the Historical-Institutionalist perspective predicts that policies departing from fundamental, historical norms are unlikely to persist and in time will revert to the
51
nation’s historical trajectory.
B. THE “REAL” CONSTITUTION MODEL
Harry Arthurs has developed taxonomy of constitutions including what he labels the “real” constitution and the “juridi52
cal” constitution. Arthurs contends that a nation’s history, political economy, demographics, and resources—what he labels
the “real” constitution—are the key determinants of the system
53
of labor laws and labor relations that ultimately develop. The
“juridical” constitution, including the Charter and constitutional litigation, are not likely to overcome these other forces,
which he characterizes as the economy and societies’ “deep
54
structures.” Therefore, changes in labor relations are products
of shifts in the “real” constitution—economic and social
norms—not the result of changes in the law.
Arthurs argues that the primacy of social and political
forces over legal mobilization means that the organization of
48. Id. at 408, 410.
49. Id. at 413–14.
50. Id. at 416.
51. Id. at 415–17.
52. See Harry Arthurs, The Constitutionalization of Employment Relations: Multiple Models, Pernicious Problems, 19 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 403, 405–
09 (2010) [hereinafter Arthurs, Multiple Models] (describing rights-based litigation driven, valorizing, political, economic and enterprise constitutions). In
Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, Arthurs labels the rights-based litigation driven constitution the “real” constitution.
53. Arthurs, Multiple Models, supra note 52, at 407; Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 61–64.
54. See Arthurs, Multiple Models, supra note 52, at 406; see also Harry
Arthurs, Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers to Organize, Bargain and
Strike: The Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging, 15 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 373,
379–80 (2010) [hereinafter Arthurs, Shrugging].
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political and legal institutions become relevant as influences
55
shaping these norms. As Arthurs points out, in Canada, these
56
institutions tend not to favour labor and social interests.
First, the distribution of powers between the federal and provincial governments gives the federal government considerable
power to organize the economy but little responsibility over la57
bor or social matters. Arthurs’ contends that this distribution
of powers is ideally organized to subordinate labor and social
58
policies to the interests of global trade.
Second, Arthurs points to the “institutional architecture” of
Canadian governments and, in particular, those branches and
ministries responsible for setting and enforcing labor and social
59
rights. As labor ministries are diminished and reconfigured,
responsibility for labor and social rights is shifted towards ministries of trade and finance such that labor and social rights are
regarded as merely “residual by-product of economic policy”
60
without inherent value. Finally, Arthurs notes the power of
domestic and international courts and tribunals to prevent legislatures and governments from implementing labor or social
61
policies interfering with commercial interests.
If the “real” constitution perspective holds, then Arthurs
suggests that strong labor and social rights may be preserved if
workers are sufficiently able to mobilize and protect rights
through social and political campaigns. In short “‘real constitu62
tions’ are what we make them.” Litigation, including constitu63
tional litigation will not provide the protection workers seek.
IV. HISTORICAL REJECTION AND RESISTANCE
This paper has introduced two perspectives addressing
how labor law and policy develop, and the conditions necessary
for substantial change. Although the Historical-Institutionalist
55. Arthurs, Shrugging, supra note 54, at 387.
56. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 62.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 62–63.
60. Id.; see also William D. Coleman, Business, Labour, and Redistributive
Politics, in INEQUALITY AND THE FADING OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 93, 94,
111 (Keith Banting & John Myles eds., 2013).
61. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 63.
62. Id. at 64.
63. Id. at 63, 64; Harry Arthurs, The Constitutionalization of Labour
Rights: What Bliss in This Dawn to Be Alive 14 (June 11, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1634902.
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and “Real” Constitution perspectives differ in some regards,
they share the view that the political economy is the crucial determinant. Both perspectives also recognize that attempted
changes to labor and social policy may fail if they diverge too
far from established norms or if changes are met with sufficient
social or political resistance by citizens or workers.
This Part provides an overview of the prevalence of different union security arrangements in Canada and historical
campaigns to introduce right-to-work (RTW) legislation. It then
considers why these past efforts failed in relation to the historical-institutionalist and “real” constitution perspectives.
RTW legislation has failed, to this point, to gain purchase
in Canada despite repeated efforts by certain industry groups
(primarily construction), anti-labor organizations, and certain
elements in right-of-center governments and parties across the
country since at least the 1970s. Unlike in the United States,
where RTW legislation is widespread, no Canadian jurisdiction
has yet adopted legislation limiting union membership or mandatory dues payment. Some commentators regard this, and the
widespread application of “agency shop” or “Rand Formula” union security provisions in Canada, as a vital difference in the
two countries’ labor laws and a central reason for the wide di64
vergence in union densities.

64. See, e.g., Daphne Gottlieb Taras & Allen Ponak, Mandatory Agency
Shop Laws as an Explanation of Canada-U.S. Union Density Divergence, 22 J.
LAB. RES. 541, 553–57 (2001).
Regarding membership provisions: “closed shop” refers to collective
agreement provisions wherein the employer has agreed to hire only members
of the union. “Union shop” provisions require all employees to join the union
once hired (variations on “union shop” include “maintenance of membership”
provisions, simply requiring existing members to retain membership, or “modified union shop” which doesn’t require pre-existing non-members to join), but
new employees must become members and pre-existing union members must
maintain membership.
Some union security provisions only address dues payment. “Check-off”
provisions don’t require employees to join the union, although the employer
will deduct and remit dues for union members. Some versions of these clauses
require individual union members’ authorization for dues check-off. “Agency
shop” (as it is more commonly called in the U.S.) or “Rand Formula” provisions, as they are generally referred to in Canada, don’t require employees to
join the union. However, all employees in the bargaining unit are required to
pay union dues or the equivalent, whether or not they join the union. Commonly the Rand Formula provision is accompanied by a provision for automatic employer dues check-off for all employees in the bargaining unit. See 2
GEORGE W. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW, ¶¶ 14.200–230 (2d ed. 2013);
MICHAEL MAC NEIL ET AL., TRADE UNION LAW IN CANADA ¶ 2.90 (2000).
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RTW initiatives are commonly fueled by agitation over the
perception of widespread “closed shop” and mandatory dues
65
payment collective bargaining agreement provisions. However, although all jurisdictions in Canada permit closed shop arrangements, evidence suggests that it is very uncommon and is
66
likely concentrated in the construction industry. Currently no
labor legislation in Canada restricts the use of union dues although, briefly in the past, labor laws in some jurisdictions lim67
ited political uses of union dues. In contrast, existing election
laws in several Canadian jurisdictions do prohibit political con68
tributions by unions.

65. See ADAMS, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 14.200–230.
66. See MAC NEIL ET AL., supra note 64, at ¶¶ 2.90, 2.100. Note that in
this Article the terms “collective agreement” and “collective bargaining agreement” are used interchangeably. A 2007 review of union membership provisions in Canadian collective agreements covering 500 or more employees found
7.5% provided for closed shop, while 40.7% were “open shop,” containing no
membership requirement provisions. Anthony Giles & Akivah Starkman, The
Collective Agreement, in CANADIAN LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
283, 295 (Morley Gunderson & Daphne Taras eds., 6th ed. 2009). Notably an
earlier, 1989, survey of major non-construction industry collective agreements
found only 1.0% of agreements contained closed shop provisions. MAC NEIL ET
AL., supra note 64, at ¶ 2.100 (citing DAVID ARROWSMITH & MELANIE
COURCHENE, THE CURRENT INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SCENE IN CANADA 1989:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REFERENCE TABLES 75 (1990)). These findings suggest that closed shop arrangements are uncommon outside the construction
industry. In terms of dues provisions, 46.9% of agreements contained a Rand
Formula provision, while 46.5% contained another form of dues check-off provision. Id.
67. In Manitoba there existed a short-lived requirement that unions establish and apply a procedure to consult individual bargaining unit employees
prior to using union dues for defined political activities. Labour Relations Act,
C.C.S.M., c. L10, s. 29.1 (Can.) (enacted 1996, c. 32, s. 6; repealed 2000, c. 45,
s.4), s. 76.1 (enacted 1996, c. 32, s. 15; repealed 2000, c. 45, s. 17); see ADAMS,
supra note 64, at ¶ 14.370; see also MAC NEIL ET AL., supra note 64, at
¶¶ 3.370–3.380 (regarding prohibitions in labor legislation on use of union
dues collected via dues check-off arrangements for political purposes that existed in the provinces of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island in the
1960s but were repealed in the 1970s).
68. See, e.g., Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 404(1) (Can.) (prohibiting trade unions from making financial contributions to election campaigns); The Election Financing Act, C.C.S.M., c. E27, s. 33 (Man.) (prohibiting
election campaign contributions in Manitoba by “[a] person or organization,
other than an individual normally resident in Manitoba”); Elections Act,
S.N.S. 2011, c. 5, ss. 234(1), and 246(1) (N.S.) (prohibiting political contributions in Nova Scotia except as permitted by the Act; permits only “individuals,” the definition of which does not include unions, to make contributions);
Election Act, R.S.Q., c. E-3.3, s. 87 (Que.) (limiting election contributions in
Québec to “electors,” the definition of which does not include unions).
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Right-of-center political parties in Canada have supported
various RTW initiatives in discussion papers and platforms,
and unsuccessfully introduced RTW bills. These are commonly
introduced as private members’ bills, even where the party is in
power, likely as a means of distancing the government from the
issue. However, the RTW issue has generally been regarded as
too divisive and likely to alienate constituents and voters to become an issue these parties are prepared to seriously pursue.
Right-of-center governments have declined to pursue RTW be69
cause of concern over the labor unrest doing so would provoke.
Right-of-center government leaders have also decisively
rebuffed RTW drives. For instance, at the 1977 party convention, Alberta Progressive Conservative Premier Peter Lougheed
opposed a RTW resolution, stating that the province was not a
“class society” and cautioning the Party that it must represent
a “consensus” view of Albertans, rather than cater to a single
70
occupational group. The government also repeatedly assured
the Alberta Federation of Labour that it did not intend to allow
71
RTW in the province. Nonetheless, Premier Lougheed was
prepared to take strong positions on labor law that were viewed
72
as anti-labor, if not contrary to the Charter.
That same year a RTW resolution to ban closed shops
failed to pass at the British Columbia Social Credit party con-

69. For example, in 1977 the Manitoba government declined to study
RTW proposals in the face of the Manitoba Federation of Labour’s threat to
call a general strike. See Errol Black & Jim Silver, The Threat of Right-toWork Laws and the Need for Social Solidarity, CCPA REV. LABOUR NOTES,
August 2012, at 4, available at https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/
files/uploads/publications/Manitoba%20Office/2012/08/Right%20to%20work
.pdf. In the mid-1970s the Ontario Progressive Conservative government examined U.S. RTW legislation and considered prohibiting closed shops, but preferred not to resort to legislation because it would alienate labor. End to
Closed Union Shops Studied, LONDON FREE PRESS, Oct. 14, 1976, at 4.
70. Gordon Jaremko, Tories Want Closed-Shop Practice Abolished,
CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 28, 1977, at 4.
71. ALB. FED’N OF LABOUR, POLICY STATEMENT, SO-CALLED RIGHT TO
WORK (1978).
72. For example, in the mid-1980s, anticipating that the S.C.C. would rule
the legislation to be contrary to the Charter, Premier Lougheed threatened to
employ the notwithstanding clause in Constitution to protect provincial legislation denying Alberta public sector workers the right to strike. ALBERTA
HANSARD NO. 69, at 1680 (Nov. 17 1983); Peter Lougheed, Why a Notwithstanding Clause?, POINTS OF VIEW/POINTS DE VUE (Ctr. for Constitutional
Studies, Alb., Can.), no. 6, 1998, at 10, available at http://ualawccsprod.srv
.ualberta.ca/ccs/images/points-of-view/Lougheed.pdf.
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73

vention. Both Social Credit Premier Bill Bennett and the Minister of Labour Allan Williams had publicly opposed RTW and
the Minister vigorously opposed the convention motion, later
stating that had the motion passed he still would not have rec74
ommended RTW legislation. A subsequent leak of the Minister’s letter to the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations
Commission enquiring about the state’s RTW referendum
threatened to be a “political bombshell” in the upcoming pro75
vincial election. Concern over igniting labor unrest restrained
this otherwise notoriously anti-union government from con76
templating RTW.
Meanwhile, in Ontario in the mid-1970s the Progressive
Conservative (PC) government examined US RTW legislation
and considered prohibiting closed shop collective agreement
provisions. However, the Ministry of Labour indicated that it
preferred not to resort to legislation because it would alienate
labor, and would rather reach some agreement on the issue
77
with unions. Later that fall, a resolution supporting RTW was
endorsed by delegates to the annual convention of Provincial
78
Building and Construction Trades Council of Ontario. However, by the end of that decade, and motivated by several bitter
first contract disputes centering on union security, the PC government introduced an amendment to the province’s general
labor legislation imposing mandatory dues checkoff, the “Rand
79
Formula” as the default union security provision. RTW did not
become an issue again in this province until the next century.

73. B.C. Socreds Reject ‘Right-to-Work’ Law, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 28,
1976.
74. Id.; Rod Mickleburgh, B.C. Fed Plans Campaign to Fight Right-toWork Laws, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 17, 1977.
75. John Clarke, Leaked Right-to-Work Letter May be Political Bombshell,
GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 17, 1979, at 8.
76. John Clarke, Right-to-Work Battle Heats Up, GLOBE & MAIL, June 10,
1978, at 8.
77. End to Closed Union Shops Studied, supra note 69.
78. Trades Resist Right to Work, DAILY COM. NEWS, Nov. 9, 1976, at A3.
79. Bill 89, An Act to Amend The Labour Relations Act, 1951 (Ont.); Jeffery Sack & Howard Goldblatt eds., Compulsory Dues Checkoff Now Law in
Ontario, LABOUR L. NEWS, June 1980, at 1. Notably, Dr. Robert Elgie, the
former Labour Minister responsible for Bill 89, recently expressed dismay over
current interest in RTW legislation in Canada, characterizing it as the first
step in the destruction of free market collective bargaining. Tim Armstrong,
Remembering the Remarkable Bob Elgie, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, May 9, 2013,
http://www.thespec.com/opinion-story/2556586-remembering-the-remarkable
-bob-elgie/.
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The most serious consideration to date given to RTW in
80
Canada occurred in Alberta in 1995. Responding to a private
members’ bill asking the government to examine RTW, which
passed by a single vote, the PC government established a committee of the Alberta Economic Development Authority to study
81
the matter. The Committee was headed by a former PC Minister of Labour, Elaine McCoy, and included government, busi82
ness, and labor representatives. Not only did the current Minister of Labour oppose labor law reform, but most employers
and employer groups making submissions to the Committee
opposed RTW on the basis that it would unnecessarily damage
83
labor-relations stability. The Committee unanimously rejected
RTW. It concluded that introducing RTW offered few economic
84
benefits, and would likely produce labor relations instability.
On occasion, RTW proposals have been employed by rightof-center parties in election campaigns. However, these have
not led to legislative change, even when that party won the
election. For instance, the 2000 and 2003 re-election platforms
of Mike Harris’ PC government in Ontario included a variety of
anti-union planks, including proposals targeting mandatory union dues, restrictions on use of dues, and union membership re85
quirements. Nonetheless, and even though the PCs won both
elections, the PC government did not even introduce any such
amendments to the province’s labor legislation.
The positions taken by these right-of-center leaders and
governments in response to RTW efforts can be interpreted as
reflecting the “Red Tory” tradition in Canadian politics, a no86
tion that has been described as “‘alien’ to the American mind.”
As vividly explained by Gad Horowitz:
80. See YONATAN RESHEF & SANDRA RASTIN, UNIONS IN THE TIME OF
REVOLUTION 80–81 (2003).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 81.
83. Id.; Allen Ponak et al., Alberta: Industrial Relations in a Conservative
Climate, in BEYOND THE NATIONAL DIVIDE: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 267, 287–88 (Mark Thompson et al. eds., 2003).
84. Ponak et al., supra note 83, at 288.
85. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF ONT., THE ROAD
AHEAD: A WORKERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 1-2 (2003) (on file with the author); ONT.
RED TAPE COMM’N, ENHANCING WORKER DEMOCRACY (2000), available at
http://ofl.ca/wp-content/uploads/2000.07.01-Submission-LabourLawReform.pdf
(document circulated among employer groups prior to 2000 election).
86. GAD HOROWITZ, CANADIAN LABOUR IN POLITICS 10 (1968). This suggestion will be contentious, particularly as regards identifying Bill Bennett or
the modern Social Credit party with Red Toryism.
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At the simplest level, [a Red Tory] is a Conservative who prefers the
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation / New Democratic party to
the Liberals, or a socialist who prefers the Conservatives to the Liberals, . . . [and] is a conscious ideological Conservative with some
“odd” socialist notions . . . or a conscious ideological socialist with
some “odd” tory notions. . . . The very suggestion that such affinities
might exist between Republicans and socialists in the United States
is ludicrous enough to make some kind of a point. . . .
. . . The tory and socialist minds have some crucial assumptions, orientation, and values in common, so that from a certain angle they
may appear not as enemies but as two different expressions of the
87
same basic ideological outlook.

Union security questions, raising the specter of RTW, have
only been addressed twice by the SCC: the 1991 Lavigne deci88
sion and the 2001 Advance Cutting decision. Notably, both
cases were decided in the Trilogy era. Lavigne involved a claim
that a statutory provision permitting negotiation of Rand Formula dues check-off provisions violated the Charter’s FOA and
89
freedom of expression guarantees. Considering the FOA claim
only, the SCC unanimously found no FOA violation where dues
90
would be used only for the purposes of collective bargaining.
Three justices held that a freedom of non-association is not
Charter protected; while four recognized a freedom of non91
association as a Charter protected freedom.
However, the opinions reflected very different views of the
importance of the purpose of dues expenditures among the justices recognizing a protected freedom of non-association. Justices LaForest, Sopinka and Gonthier held that in the context of
use of union dues for purposes other than collective bargaining,
the impugned provision constituted a violation of the freedom
of non-association, but concluded that this violation was saved
by Section 1 of the Charter on the basis that the infringement
was minimally impairing, and made it possible for unions to
92
participate in economic, social and policy discourse. In contrast, Justice McLachlin held that the purpose of dues expenditures was not relevant because the purpose of the freedom of
non-association is to provide freedom from ideological conformity, and regardless of the use to which the dues were put, simply
87. Id. at 23.
88. Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R.
211 (Can.); R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (Can.).
89. Lavigne, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 212.
90. Id. at 213–18.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 213–15.
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paying union dues did not demand ideological conformity. In
sum, the SCC’s judgment found the provision to be constitutionally valid.
The Lavigne decision is notable for its explicit distinction
between U.S. and Canadian constitutional guarantees of freedom of association including recognition of the importance of
the Charter’s Section 1, distinguishing the United States approach to union dues collection, recognition of the importance of
industrial peace ensured by collective bargaining and union security, affirmation of unions as democratic organizations, and
94
recognition of unions’ role in Canadian democracy.
The second decision, Advance Cutting, involved a challenge
to Québec construction labor legislation that effectively imposed a “union shop” by making union membership a condition
95
of employment in the industry, as violating the Charter FOA.
Although the SCC upheld the legislation in a 5 to 4 decision,
the individual opinions were far less supportive of strong union
security provisions than had been the case in the earlier
96
Lavigne decision. Eight justices recognized a freedom of nonassociation, and five held that mandatory union membership
97
violated this freedom. Four of these five found that this violation could not be saved by Section 1, while the fifth concluded
98
that it was a reasonable limit justifiable under Section 1.
Therefore, this provision was upheld by the slenderest of margins.
Unlike Lavigne, the Advance Cutting decision produced
99
unanimous recognition of a freedom of non-association. Nonetheless, as in Lavigne, the Advance Cutting decision again explicitly affirmed unions’ valuable and legitimate role in demo100
cratic discourse.
In short, the historical experience in Canada has been that
RTW and associated proposals to limit collection or expenditure
of union dues have failed to take root. Industry and other
groups have not succeeded in convincing governments, includ93. Id. at 217–18.
94. Id.
95. R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, 210–11
(Can.).
96. Id. at 211–19.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 216–19.
99. Id.; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 211 (Can.).
100. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209.
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ing right-of-center governments responsible for other wideranging and significant anti-labor legislation, to pursue or implement RTW or restrictive dues legislation. The long history of
such efforts indicates that even right-of-center governments
and parties in Canada have a tradition of respecting a diversity
of views on labor, the role of labor, and, especially, the value of
labor peace and the labor movement’s capacity to mobilize in
protest. It was this “real” power of labor, and the power of social norms and institutions, including the Red Tory tradition,
rather than legal or constitutional protections that has histori101
cally blocked adoption of US-style RTW legislation.
V. REVIVAL AND RESISTANCE
This Part provides an overview of significant contemporary
changes directly affecting labor relations. These include wideranging efforts by right-of-center parties to achieve anti-labor
legislative changes directed at financially undermining unions,
restricting unions’ political voice, and promoting right-to102
work. The following Part considers whether Charter litigation or the labor movement’s recent countervailing efforts are
likely to successfully resist this renewed wave of anti-union and
RTW efforts. In short, despite the greater protection offered by
Canada’s juridical constitution, has its “real” constitution undergone greater, countervailing change reflecting a fundamental shift in the nation’s norms and values underpinning Canadian labor law?
Recent years have seen a new wave of activist organizations and right-of-center political parties aggressively pursuing
a variety of anti-union (including RTW) legislation and policies
at the federal and provincial levels. Governments’ role in, and
reception to, these initiatives are markedly different from past
experiences.
A. FEDERAL LEVEL
The federal Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) government, a right-of-center government in power since 2004 and
holding majority government since 2011, has recently intro101. Although the Charter came into effect in 1982, the Bill of Rights existed and could have been applicable. See generally Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C.
1960, c. 44 (Can.).
102. Debra Parkes, The Rand Formula Revisited: Union Security in the
Charter Era, 34 MAN. L.J. 223 (2010) (observing that “the Rand formula, while
not under direct attack, is by no means sacrosanct in the political realm”).
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duced a succession of anti-union bills. These include: provisions
fundamentally restructuring collective bargaining for Crown
corporations to increase Treasury Board control over negotiating mandates, bargaining, and collective agreements embedded
103
in a lengthy and complex omnibus bill; a CPC private member’s bill affecting many workers in the federal jurisdiction, replacing card-check certification with a mandatory representation vote, raising the threshold necessary for a successful
certification vote, and resetting the default outcome of a decer104
tification vote to termination of collective representation; an
omnibus bill including significant amendments to grievance
and interest arbitration schemes, granting the government unilateral power to designate essential services, and limiting bar105
gaining dispute resolution procedures.
Although these bills met with some resistance from the labor movement and the opposition, they had the clear support of
CPC members of parliament and senators. However, with a final piece of legislation, Bill C-377, there are has been strong
resistance from within the CPC party and from CPC statesmen
106
such as Senator Hugh Segal.
Bill C-377 is one of the most direct legislative attacks on
unions Canada has seen and it is regarded as laying the
groundwork for RTW legislation. The CPC government has
107
been pursing passage of Bill C-377 since fall 2011. Introduced
as a CPC private members’ bill, it clearly has the Prime Minister’s support. C-377 requires all “labour organizations” (including unions and other organizations such as councils and congresses) and “labour trusts” to report detailed financial

103. Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 1, S.C. 2013, c. 33 (Can.).
104. Bill C-525, Employees’ Voting Rights Act, 2013 (Can.).
105. Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2, S.C. 2013, c. 40 (Can.).
106. 148 PARL. DEB., H.C. (No. 175) (June 17, 2013) pp. 4297–98 (Can.)
(Statement of Hon. Hugh Segal), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/
Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/pdf/175db_2013-06-17-e.pdf; Bill C-377, An Act to
Amend the Income Tax Act (Requirements for Labour Organizations), 2011
(Can.).
107. Bill C-377 was introduced, in its first incarnation, as Bill C-317, An
Act to Amend the Income Tax Act (Labour Organizations), 2011 (Can.), in October 2011. However, it failed at second reading because it was found to be
improperly before the House. It was subsequently reintroduced as Bill C-377,
in December 2011. See 146 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 44) (Nov. 4, 2011) p. 2984
(Can.) (Speaker’s ruling), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/House
Publications/Publication.aspx?Pub=Hansard&Doc=44&Parl=41&Ses=1&
Language=E&Mode=1.
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108

information to the Minister of Finance. The Ministry will
make this information publicly available, including in a
109
searchable format on a Ministry website. Contravention of
these requirements would be a summary conviction offence, attracting a fine of $1000 per day of non-compliance, to a maxi110
mum of $25,000. C-377 requires unions to disclose a great
deal of information revealing how they spend their funds and
the amount of time key individuals spend on different activi111
ties.
The clear purpose of C-377 is to provide anti-union
groups and governments with detailed information about union
activities and expenditures in order to challenge the legitimacy
(and perhaps legality) of unions’ use of union dues for purposes
outside narrow labor relations purpose and, more broadly, the
legitimacy of unions’ participation in activities beyond the immediate workplace.
Although C-377 passed the House of Commons in December 2012 with no CPC Minister of Parliament voting against
112
the Bill, it met significant resistance in the Senate, including
from prominent Senators in the CPC Caucus. Primary among
these was CPC Senator Hugh Segal. Senator Segal strongly objected to C-377 in the Senate, denouncing it as “[b]ad legislation, bad public policy and a diminution of both the order and
the freedom that should exist in any democratic, pluralist and
mixed-market society” and contended that this Bill “is not who
113
we are as Canadians. It is time this chamber said so.” Senator Segal’s remarks, set out at some length below, reflect and
invoke the traditional Red Tory conservatism and recognition
of unions as legitimate—and valuable—participants in democratic dialogue:
As a Tory, I believe that society prospers when different views
about the public agenda, on the left and the right, are advanced by
different groups, individuals and interests. Debate between opposing
groups in this chamber, in [the House of Commons] and in broader
society is the essence of democracy. Limiting that debate as to scope

108. Bill C-377.
109. Id. at c. 149.01(4).
110. Id. at c. 149.01(2.31).
111. Id. at c. 149.01(3).
112. 146 PARL. DEB. H.C. (No. 197) (December 12, 2012) pp. 13250 (Can.)
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=
Hansard&Doc=197&Parl=41&Ses=1&Language=E&Mode=1
113. 148 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 138) (Feb. 14, 2011) pp. 3291–92 (Can.)
(statement of Hon. Hugh Segal), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/
Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/138db_2013-02-14-e.htm#41.
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and breadth is never in the long-term interest of a free and orderly
114
society.

Senator Segal objected to C-377 as contrary to the values of
Canadian conservatism:
The conservatism I absorbed and supported from leaders like Daniel
Johnson—the father, not the son—Jean-Jacques Bertrand and Jean
Charest in Québec; John Robarts and Bill Davis in Ontario; Bob Stanfield in Nova Scotia and Ottawa; Peter Lougheed in Alberta; Richard
Hatfield in New Brunswick; Angus MacLean in Prince Edward Island; and Brian Mulroney and Stephen Harper in Ottawa is an inclusive view of society, where there is room in the debate about our economic choices, preferences and future in this country for all.
Hobbling one part of the debate is not what mainstream Conservatives should ever want to do to legislators at any time. There
will be agreements, disagreements on occasion, difficult strikes and
challenging choices. However, the civility of that debate is sustained
by how open it is to all who are legitimate stakeholders in any economic outcome. Trade unions and public sector unions are part of
those stakeholders, and they are legitimate.
Conservatism in the Canadian Tory context is not about the protection of class or the oppression of labour by capital or capital by labour; it is about a freedom tied to mutual respect, whatever legitimate disagreements, between all the participants in the mixed freemarket system. This bill before us, whatever may have been its laudable transparency goals, is really—through drafting sins of omission
and commission—an expression of statutory contempt for the working
men and women in our trade unions and for the trade unions them115
selves and their right under federal and provincial law to organize.

In mid-June 2013 the Standing Senate Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce reported to the Senate, noting
“the vast majority of testimony and submissions raised serious
116
concerns about this legislation.” Five provinces, reflecting a
114. Id. at 3291.
115. 148 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 175) (June 17, 2013) pp. 4297–98 (Can.),
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/pdf/
175db_2013-06-17-e.pdf.
116. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE AND COMMERCE REPORT TO
SENATE, OBSERVATIONS TO THE THIRTEENTH REPORT, June 13, 2013, Sen. 174,
at p. 2648 (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/
411/Journals/174jr_2013-06-13-e.htm.
Numerous individuals (including law professors), organizations (including
the Canadian Bar Association, the Federation of Law Societies, and the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers), the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
and five provincial governments raised serious concerns with Bill C-377 before
the Senate Committee. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada was among the
objectors, citing privacy concerns over the scope of disclosure and provision of
individual’s names. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, APPEARANCE BEFORE THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE AND COMMERCE
ON THE STUDY ON BILL C-377, AN ACT TO AMEND THE INCOME TAX ACT (REQUIREMENTS FOR LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS) May 29, 2013, Sen. 35 (opening
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spectrum of political parties in power, brought objections to the
117
Committee. As described by the Honourable Senator Cowan,
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate: “All [of these provinces]
said that the bill is not constitutional, is not needed and would
negatively disrupt labour relations in the province. Not one
province wrote in or sent a representative to argue that the bill
is a constitutional exercise of federal jurisdiction and should be
118
passed.”
Thereafter, Senator Segal successfully proposed amendments to C-377 limiting the Bill’s application with more than a
third of the PC caucus voting in favor. However, the Prime
Minister prorogued Parliament shortly thereafter, and reintroduced Bill C-377 in Senate, in its original form and without the
Segal amendments, the day after the new session commenced
119
in October 2013.
The CPC’s fall 2013 convention provided more evidence
that the values of the federal CPC party have shifted decisively
away from Senator Segal’s Red Tory values. At the convention
120
six anti-labor policy resolutions were passed. Several overlapped but, in summary, included: supporting greater union financial reporting requirements, including requiring unions to
detail budget allocations to “political donations, donations to
media organization, and to political activism and campaigns”;
permitting union members to opt out of union dues allocated to
donations to media organization or political uses or activism;
preventing mandatorily collected dues from being used to fund
political causes unrelated to the workplace; modifying the Party’s statement of policy to provide that the CPC “believes that
statement of Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Comm’r) (Can.), available at http://
www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2013/parl_20130529_e.asp.
117. Representatives of Nova Scotia and Manitoba (each with NDP governments) testified before the Committee. Minister of Labour from Ontario
(Liberal government), New Brunswick (Progressive Conservative government),
and Québec (Parti Québécois minority government) filed written submissions
with the Committee. COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE, AND COMMERCE, PROCEEDINGS ON BILL C-377, June 6, 2013, Sen. 36, (Can.), available at http://
www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/411/banc/pdf/36issue.pdf.
118. 148 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 176) (June 18, 2013) p. 4321 (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/pdf/176db_
2013-06-18-e.pdf.
119. At the time of this writing, Bill C-377 is at second reading (for the second time) in the Senate.
120. CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA, POLICY FLOOR RESOLUTIONS:
CANADA’S SOCIAL FABRIC, Res. 1-06-015; 1-15-159; 2-22-004; 3-01-066; 3-02069; and 3-19-077 (2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/147373792/
Policy-Resolutions-2013-Conservative-Party-of-Canada-Convention.
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mandatory union membership and forced financial contributions as a condition of employment limit the economic freedom
of Canadians and stifle economic growth”; and explicitly calling
121
for right to work legislation.
B. ONTARIO
The PC Party of Ontario currently serves as the Official
Opposition. The Liberal Party has formed the government since
2003, although only winning a minority government in the
2007 and 2011 elections. The PCs, under leader Tim Hudak,
have adopted an aggressive anti-union approach, including explicit support for RTW and associated policies and a series of
122
bills reflecting these priorities.
The Party’s policy explicitly includes eliminating legislative support for union membership or dues as a condition of
employment, employer dues check-off, and introducing statutory requirements for unions to publicly disclose detailed finan123
cial information. Similarly, at the Party’s Fall 2013 policy
conference, a resolution to seek to end mandatory union membership passed with the support of 53% of voting delegates, although some delegates were concerned about alienating voters
124
with such anti-worker policies.
The PC party has also introduced a series of bills (none of
which passed) proposing anti-labor amendments to the OLRA
centering on provisions dealing with union membership and
125
dues. These bills proposed restricting dues check-off provisions to funds used for the purpose of collective bargaining; removing explicit statutory permission for parties to negotiate
121. Id.
122. Hudak subsequently retreated from this position, after months of intense pressure from the Party. Adrian Morrow, Hudak Backs Down on AntiUnion Proposal, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 6, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail
.com/news/politics/ontario-tories-facing-internal-dissent-over-right-to-work
-laws/article16725250/ (suggesting the PCs enthusiasm for right to work legislation was waning by early 2014).
123. ONT. PC CAUCUS, PATHS TO PROSPERITY: FLEXIBLE LABOUR MARKETS
19 (2012), available at http://ontariopc.uberflip.com/i/103096.
124. Maria Babbage, Hudak Won’t Back Down on Controversial Union Policies, Despite Split in Party, RECORD, Sept. 29, 2013, http://www.therecord
.com/news-story/4131181-hudak-won-t-back-down-on-controversial-union
-policies-despite-split-in-party/.
125. Bill 64, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and
Financial Disclosure by Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 78, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and Financial Disclosure by Trade
Unions), 2012 (Ont.); Bill 71, Defending Employees’ Rights Act, 2010 (Ont.).
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certain union security and deeming any such terms provisions
to be void; and requiring every union that is party to a collective agreement (whether certified or not) to file detailed financial information with the Minister of Labour which then would
126
be made publicly available.
The Ontario PCs also introduced bills proposing broader
anti-labor amendments to the OLRA including eliminating unions’ exclusive representation in bargaining by making collec127
tive agreements binding only on union members; prohibiting
128
card-check and remedial certification;
extending the campaign period in representation votes; restricting strikes in the
construction industry; replacing the Ontario Labour Relations
Board’s (OLRB) authority to determine practice and procedures
with regulations made by the Lieutenant Governor in Council;
introducing a right to appeal OLRB decisions; making OLRB
members and officers, the Minister of Labour, and any Ministry
129
officials compellable witnesses before a court or tribunal;
shifting the burden of proof in all unfair labor practice com130
plaints to the employer; and limiting bargaining rights in the
131
construction sector.
C. RESISTANCE: CHARTER LITIGATION
As discussed earlier, Charter litigation has been a tool labor has resorted to in the past in the face of hostile governments, policy, and legislation. While the early years of the
Charter offered little support to labor, the 2007 Health Services
decision reinvigorated the Charter as a possible means for protecting and perhaps even advancing labor rights.

126. See supra note 125.
127. Bill 64, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and
Financial Disclosure by Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 78, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and Financial Disclosure by Trade
Unions), 2012 (Ont.).
128. Bill 62, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Certification of Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 94, Labour Relations Amendment Act (Bargaining
Units and Certification of Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.).
129. Bill 63, Labour Relations Amendment Act (Ontario Labour Relations
Board), 2013 (Ont.).
130. Bill 94, Labour Relations Amendment Act (Bargaining Units and Certification of Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.).
131. Bill 73, Fair and Open Tendering Act (Labour Relations for Certain
Public Sector Employers in the Construction Industry), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 74,
Fairness and Competitiveness in Ontario's Construction Industry Act, 2013
(Ont.).
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In a well-known 1992 article, Brian Etherington identified
three streams of commentary regarding the Charter’s prospects
for reforming labor law: liberal romantics (optimistic about the
Charter’s potential to defend labor law from excessive government incursions); realists or skeptics (wary of neoliberal interpretation and application of the Charter to defeat existing protective labor legislation); and pragmatic pluralists (though
concerned about appropriateness of courts as a forum for deciding labor policy issues, optimistic that courts would only inter132
vene when appropriate). He left it open whether the realists
or pluralists would be proven right, concluding that only ro133
mantics were consistently disappointed by the Charter.
Although Health Services was cause for some romantic revival, many commentators, including Etherington, remained
134
skeptical and greeted the decision with strong criticism. Harry Arthurs, among the most prominent Charter skeptics, may
also be fairly described as skeptical of the prospects of constitutions in general—at least juridical constitutions—for advancing
135
or protecting labor and social concerns. He views courts and,
therefore Charter litigation, as an undesirable forum for addressing labor issues, contrasting courts’ belief in “normativity
to transform reality” with the economic and social forces pro136
ducing legal norms.

132. Brian Etherington, An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws
Under the Charter: Of Realists, Romantics, and Pragmatists, 24 OTTAWA L.
REV. 685, 688–95 (1992) [hereinafter Etherington, Judicial Review].
133. Id. at 726–28.
134. See, e.g., Beth Bilson, Developments in Labour Law: The 2010–2011
Term—Was Health Services a Mistake? The Supreme Court Decision in Fraser
v. Ontario, 55 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 285, 313–14 (2011) (criticizing the decision’s lack of clear guidelines); Etherington, Health Services, supra note 37, at
732 (describing the majority’s reasoning as “schizophrenic”); Fudge, supra note
38, at 34–36 (arguing that the majority’s concept of the right to collective bargaining is too qualified); Brian Langille, The Freedom of Association Mess:
How We Got into It and How We Can Get out of It, 54 MCGILL L.J. 177, 179–81
(2009) (arguing that the majority misunderstood Canadian labor law history,
Canadian international labor obligations, and the Charter values themselves);
Eric Tucker, The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of
Labour History in the Supreme Court of Canada, 61 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 151,
152 (2008) (criticizing the majority’s description of the history of labor law in
Canada).
135. See, e.g., Arthurs, Multiple Models, supra note 52, at 403; Arthurs,
Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 45–46; Arthurs, Shrugging, supra note 54,
at 375–78.
136. See Arthurs, Shrugging, supra note 54, at 379–80.
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Moreover, Arthurs is critical of the juridification of public
137
life through Charter litigation. He contends the Charter has
negatively affected social interests: diverting marginalized
groups’ scarce resources away from direct action and political
solutions into Charter litigation, diverting public resources
from social programs to legal proceedings, emphasizing adversarial over informal procedures, transforming corporations into
rights and freedoms wearing citizens, weakening the activist
138
state, and fostering neo-liberalism. Arthurs also concludes (in
part based on empirical research that constitutions don’t produce significant social, economic or political change) that “con139
stitutions count for something: but not that much.”
In addition, as outlined earlier, Charter rights and freedoms, including FOA, are not absolute. The tests courts apply
when ruling on Charter rights and freedoms, and justifiable
limitations on these, are suffused with social and cultural
norms and value judgments.
Furthermore, they are subject to change as these norms
and values develop. In Health Services, for instance, in rejecting the rationale underpinning the Labour Trilogy, the SCC
stated that: “a review of the jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that the holdings in the [Labour Trilogy cases]. . . can no
longer stand. None of the reasons provided by the majorities in
140
those cases survive scrutiny. . . .” In essence, the SCC was
driven by a new conception of the role of labor relations to reverse two decades of jurisprudence.
Finally, Charter rights and freedoms are also subject to the
Section 1 “saving” section, which provides that these rights and
freedoms are “subject . . . to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democrat141
ic society.” Although vague, and granting the courts enormous discretion over fundamental freedoms, Section 1 has been
described as “arguably one of the most important statements of
137. See Harry W. Arthurs, Governing the Canadian State: The Constitution in an Era of Globalization, Neo-Liberalism, Populism, Decentralization
and Judicial Activism, 13 CONST. F. 16, 21 (2003) [hereinafter Arthurs, Governing].
138. See id.
139. Id. at 16; Harry Arthurs & Brent Arnold, Does the Charter Matter?, 11
REV. CONST. STUD. 37 (2005) (empirical study of Charter effects).
140. Health Services & Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v.
British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, para. 36 (Can.).
141. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 s.1 (U.K.).
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142

[Canada’s] democratic polity.” Notably, Section 1 was incorporated into the Charter in deliberate distinction from the absolute guarantees in the U.S. Bill of Rights, out of concern that
excessive protection of liberty would jeopardize Canadian val143
ues of community and representative democracy.
The “Oakes test” used to determine whether Section 1 is
144
satisfied sets out a two-step test.
The first branch asks
whether the violation has a pressing and substantial objec145
tive. The second branch asks whether the means of achieving
the objective is proportional, based on whether the means is rationally connected to the objective, whether it minimally impairs the right or freedom, and whether there is proportionality
146
between the violation and objective. The Oakes test is a factual, contextual inquiry with social and cultural norms en147
grained in each branch of the test. Consequently, the Section
1 saving provision is a powerful mechanism which, in its grant
of judicial discretion, may serve to incorporate values into the
148
application of Charter protections.
Recalling the Lavigne and Advance Cutting cases introduced earlier, a shift in the SCC’s views towards favoring
recognition of a freedom of non-association clearly developed in
149
the decade between the decisions. The decisions plainly (and
often explicitly) incorporated social values into both the interpretations of the FOA and, most crucially, into application of
150
the Section 1 saving provision. It is not at all certain that if
similar issues came before the Court today that they would be
151
met with similar results. In part, this may be due to shifting
social values which could lead to a very different application of
Section 1. Indeed, Advance Cutting would have had the oppo142. Errol Mendes, The Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judicial Deference in the Context of Section 1, in CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS 165, 166 (Gérald-A. Beaudoin & Errol Mendes eds., 4th ed.
2005).
143. Id. at 168.
144. R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 106.
147. See id. at 105–06.
148. See Mendes, supra note 142, at 167.
149. See supra Part IV.
150. See R. v. Advance Cutting & Corning Ltd., [2001] S.C.R. 209, at 211–
14 (Can.), 216; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991]
S.C.R. 211, at 214–16 (Can.).
151. See Bilson, supra note 134, at 313; Etherington, Health Services, supra note 37, at 744–45; Mendes, supra note 142, at 210–14.

1834

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1805

site result—finding an unjustifiable violation of the freedom of
non-association—had a single justice not concluded that the
152
impugned provision satisfied the Oakes test.
Therefore, Charter litigation is an uncertain strategy for
labor to resort to in resisting the current tide of anti-union ef153
forts.
D. RESISTANCE: LABOR MOBILIZATION
A second form of labor resistance that has appeared is mobilization in the form of strategic union mergers. In August
2013 two of Canada’s largest private sector unions, the Canadian Auto Workers union (CAW) and the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) merged to create
154
a new union, “Unifor.” Unifor is now the largest private sector union in Canada, representing over 300,000 workers across
twenty sectors of the economy, and with a significant public
155
sector presence.
The overarching goal of this merger was to establish a
strong, militant union with strategic organizing and bargaining
strengths, and with social unionism as its animating philoso156
phy. Rather than a defensive move or “desperate act,” CAW
and CEP insist that this initiative is a “positive opportunity” to
respond to the challenging economic and political climate and
the associated decline in union power, and marks renewal and
157
revitalization of the union movement.
Unifor regards the breadth and depth of its presence across
the country and across several key industries as a source of
152. See Advance Cutting, [2001] S.C.R. at 216 (Iacobucci, J., arguing that
the legislation violated Section 2(d) of the Charter, but was justified under
Section 1 because of the legislation’s promotion of “social and economic objectives” in a “unique and complex historical context”).
153. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that not all union security
provisions will be subject to Charter scrutiny. Those existing in private sector
collective agreements, for instance, will clearly be beyond Charter review. See
Health Services & Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. British
Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 88 (clarifying that the Charter applies
only to state action).
154. Jeff Mackey, Unifor, Canada’s Newest Union, Formed as CAW, CEP
Merge, HUFFINGTON POST CAN., Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/
2013/08/31/unifor-caw-cep-merger_n_3847388.
155. CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM., TOWARDS A NEW UNION: CAW CEP
PROPOSAL COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 9–10 (2012), available at http://www
.newunionproject.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Final.Report.pdf.
156. Id. at 18–19.
157. Id. at 5–6, 8.
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strength in bargaining power, in pursuing industrial and economic strategies promoting good jobs in these sectors, and in
responding to government policy and initiatives relating to
158
structural and technical changes in these industries. Unifor
regards this as crucial for certain federally regulated sectors
159
undergoing significant reform.
Unifor plans to focus on organizing, including prioritizing
increasing representation in leading industries and geographic
160
areas where it already has a substantial presence, and em161
phasizing corporate campaigns and use of neutrality agree162
ments which, to this point, have not been a prominent feature
of the Canadian labor relations landscape. Another innovative
strategy is the creation of “Community Chapters” open for
membership to a broad array of “workers” who are not in a cer163
tified or voluntarily recognized bargaining unit. Goals of the
Community Chapter strategy include increasing Unifor’s membership, building its credibility with the public as benefiting all
workers, providing a means for training future union leaders,
164
and supporting organizing efforts among these workers. In
this way Unifor hopes to set the foundation for future successful organizing campaigns and “build a culture of collective action and union solidarity” within non-unionized workplaces and
165
among unrepresented workers.
A second significant union merger was also attempted in
2013. The Telecommunications Workers Union (TWU), representing about 13,000 workers, primarily in the federally regu166
lated telecommunications sector, arrived at a tentative merger agreement with the United Steelworkers of Canada
158. See id. at 9–10.
159. See id. at 10.
160. Id. at 29; UNIFOR, UNIFOR ORGANIZING POLICY 6 (2013), available at
http://www.newunionconvention.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/675
-Organizing-Policy-fin.pdf.
161. CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM., supra note 155, at 33.
162. UNIFOR, supra note 160, at 7.
163. UNIFOR, supra note 160, at 11; see also CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM.,
supra note 155, at 30 (asserting the union’s goal to organize workers who
“cannot feasibly organize a certified bargaining unit”).
164. UNIFOR, BROADENING UNION CITIZENSHIP: UNIFOR’S MEMBERS IN
COMMUNITY CHAPTERS 1–5 (2013), http//www.newunionconvention.ca/wp
-content/uploads/2013/08/676-Union-Citizenship-web-ENG.pdf; UNIFOR, supra
note 160, at 11–12.
165. UNIFOR, supra note 160, at 11.
166. Updated Frequently Asked Questions, TELECOMM. WORKERS UNION
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.twu-stt.ca/en/updated-frequently-asked-questions.
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167

(USW), one of Canada’s largest unions, representing approx168
imately 225,000 workers predominantly in the private sector.
This merger was also motivated by the unions’ desire to
strengthen their bargaining power and political voice, and spe169
cifically to secure greater influence over federal labor policy.
However, the TWU membership vote on the merger failed by
170
less than three percent. Although the merger will not proceed, the unions will continue to participate in the strategic al171
liance they established in 2010.
The lack of corporatist institutions has been identified as
an important reason why Canada is more susceptible to the effects of globalization than are many other countries, and why
labor is disadvantaged in addressing increasingly centralized
172
government authority and policy making. William Coleman
points, in particular, to the failure of labor to create organizations that are vertically integrated, highly representative, and
173
cross class boundaries.
Although the Unifor and USW-TWU mergers may overcome some of the problems created by the mismatch between
federal and provincial jurisdiction relevant to economic and la174
bor relations issues identified by Arthurs, it will likely only
be effective in a few federally-regulated industries where the
unions have a high degree of both breadth and depth of representation. It is unlikely to bring substantial benefits at the provincial level of law and policy making. Most fundamentally,
167. Telecommunications Workers Union and United Steelworkers Announce Merger Agreement, UNITED STEELWORKERS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://
www.usw.ca/media/news/releases?id=0899 [hereinafter Merger Agreement].
168. About the United Steelworkers: Making Lives Better for Workers,
UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.ca/union/who/about?id=0002 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2014).
169. Merger Agreement, supra note 167; Updated Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 166.
170. TWU-Steelworkers Merger Falls Just Short of 66 2/3% Approval
Threshold, TELECOMM. WORKERS UNION (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.twu
-stt.ca/en/twu-steelworkers-merger-falls-just-short-66-23-approval-threshold.
171. Strengthening Our Strategic Alliance with the USW, TELECOMM.
WORKERS UNION (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.twu-stt.ca/en/strengthening-our
-strategic-alliance-usw. For the full text of motion, see TELECOMM. WORKERS
UNION, MOVING FORWARD WITH THE TWU-USW STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 1
(2013), http://www.twu-stt.ca/pdf/13-11-22_Hotline_English.pdf.
172. See William D. Coleman, Business, Labour, and Redistributive Politics, in INEQUALITY AND THE FADING OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 94 (Keith
Banting & John Myles eds., 2013).
173. Id. at 93–94, 111.
174. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 62.
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neither merged union represents a substantial portion of the
175
public sector. Given that over seventy-five percent of union176
ized workers in Canada are in the public sector, a union that
does not represent a large proportion of these workers cannot
be the type of highly representative, vertically integrated or177
ganization Coleman describes. Therefore, while these mergers may marginally increase collective bargaining power, and
perhaps substantially in certain sectors, they are not likely to
mark a significant revitalization of the labor movement.
E. RESISTANCE: STRATEGIC POLITICS
A third dimension of labor resistance takes the form of
strategic labor politics. Unions in Canada have been formally
allied with federal and provincial level social democratic politi178
cal parties since the founding of the CCF in 1932. In recent
decades, these political parties have primarily been the federal
and provincial New Democratic Party (NDP), founded in 1961
as an alliance between the CCF and the Canada Labour Con179
gress (CLC), and in Québec, the Parti Québecois (PQ). Some
commentators credit the political leverage these alliances provided with Canadian unions’ success in obtaining a favorable
180
legislative environment for labor.
For a time, these appeared to be vital partnerships, particularly following the tensions of the 1970s and 80s, arising from
government restraint and anti-inflation policies, when organized labor made great efforts to realize its political influ181
ence.
However, by the mid-1990s, these alliances showed
175. See CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM., supra note 161, at 9–10 (showing
that members in public sectors like health, education, and transit make up
less than a third of the union); supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
176. Notably, this is in a context where 24.1% of all workers in Canada are
employed in the public sector. Calculations are based on STATISTICS CANADA,
LABOUR FORCE SURVEY ESTIMATES: TABLE 282-0078, supra note 16.
177. Coleman, supra note 172, at 111.
178. HOROWITZ, supra note 86, at 61–62.
179. KEITH ARCHER & ALAN WHITEHORN, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CENTRE,
QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY, CANADIAN TRADE UNIONS AND THE NEW DEMOCRATIC
PARTY 1 (1993). However, the PQ maintained greater structural independence
from labor organizations than did other social democratic parties in Canada.
A. Brian Tanguay, Radicals, Technocrats, and Traditionalists: Interest Aggregation in Two Provincials Social Democratic Parties in Canada, in HOW POLITICAL PARTIES RESPOND: INTEREST AGGREGATION REVISITED 146, 161 (Kay
Lawson & Thomas Poguntke eds., 2004).
180. CARTER, supra note 23, at 5–6; see Sack, supra note 2, at 242–43.
181. Donald Swartz & Rosemary Warskett, Canadian Labour and the Crisis of Solidarity, in RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF LABOUR IN CANADA 18, 26–
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182

growing strain and even rupture. There has been a growing
view within parts of the NDP that, as one commentator describes it: “the NDP was doing labour a favour, that socialism
could exist without labour and that labour, not socialism, was
the problem in the NDP’s not being able to attract the working
183
and common people.” Notably, for its 2012 federal leadership
convention the NDP eliminated its practice of reserving a quar184
ter of votes for affiliated labor unions.
At the same time, many within organized labor regard the
NDP as having betrayed workers and unions and removed their
political voice with a rightward shift on economic and social
185
policies. These divisions have produced strategic voting campaigns, new Liberal-union alliances, and public ruptures of
186
NDP-union alliances.
Beginning with Ontario labor’s rejection of the provincial
NDP party after a disastrous term in government ending in
187
1995, we have seen very public and determined repudiation
by labor of its former political ally, including segments of labor
breaking from their traditional support for the NDP and PQ in
federal and provincial elections and urging members to engage
188
in strategic voting for other parties and candidates. Strategic
voting campaigns attempt to avoid having the vote split among
189
non-right-of-center parties. Generally this involves supporting Liberal candidates where the NDP or PQ candidate is
weak: in short, voting for the party most likely to defeat the
190
right-of-center candidate in that riding.

27 (Stephanie Ross & Larry Savage eds., 2012) (describing the labor movement’s strong resistance to government restrictions on worker rights and security in the 1970s and 1980s).
182. Larry Savage, Organized Labour and the Politics of Strategic Voting,
in RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF LABOUR IN CANADA 75, 77 (Stephanie Ross &
Larry Savage eds., 2012).
183. Larry Zolf, Alexa the Great, CBC NEWS VIEWPOINT (June 6, 2002),
http://archive.is/0rJML.
184. Joan Bryden, Unions Still Influential in NDP Race, CHRON. HERALD,
Feb. 23, 2012, http://thechronicleherald.ca/canada/66122-unions-still
-influential-ndp-race.
185. Savage, supra note 182, at 77; Swartz & Warskett, supra note 181, at
28–29.
186. Savage, supra note 182, at 75, 77–78, 80–81.
187. See id. at 77; Swartz & Warskett, supra note 181, at 28–29.
188. See Savage, supra note 182, at 77–78, 80–82.
189. Id. at 75–76.
190. Id. at 76.
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A related strategy has been the formation of multi-union
organizations to endorse Liberal candidates and engage in elec191
tion advertising. These include the Ontario Election Network,
composed of the CAW, several public sector unions, and build192
ing trades unions;
and the Working Families Coalition
(WFC), including teachers unions, the CAW, and several building trades unions’, which have been very active in recent pro193
vincial Ontario elections.
Not all of organized labor favors strategic voting, and this
194
division was very apparent in the 2006 federal election. The
CLC chose not to formally support any party or candidate, instead urging members to vote based on issues that affect work195
ers. Meanwhile the British Columbia Federation of Labour
196
continued its traditional support of the NDP. In contrast,
CAW President Buzz Hargrove publicly supported the incumbent Liberal government in most of the country while also urging Québec union members to vote for the Bloc Québecois as it
was more likely than Liberals to defeat the Conservatives Qué197
bec. In response, the NDP revoked Hargrove’s party member198
ship, and the CAW then publicly broke with the NDP, direct199
ing its members not to support the party. The USW has
publicly criticized the CAW’s action as short-sighted and has
200
continued to support the NDP.
191. Id. at 78, 80.
192. Id. at 78.
193. Id. at 80 & n.1. The Ontario PC Party unsuccessfully challenged the
legality of the WFC’s advertisements in the 2007 Ontario provincial election,
under the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (Ont.), claiming it was
effectively the agent of the Ontario Liberal party. PC Ont. Fund v. Essensa,
2012 CanLII 453, para. 1–2, 19 (Can. Ont. C.A.). The PCs recently introduced
an unsuccessful private member’s bill aimed at preventing election advertising
by organizations such as the WFC by limiting third party election advertising
expenses where the advertising takes a position on any issue with the legislature’s competence. Bill 101, Special Interest Groups Election Advertising
Transparency Act, 2013 (Ont.).
194. Savage, supra note 182, at 81–82.
195. Tom Barrett, Labour Grapples with Harper’s Surge: Ignoring Hargrove, BC Union Leaders Push the NDP, TYEE, Jan. 19, 2006, http://thetyee
.ca/News/2006/01/19/LabourGrapple/.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Savage, supra note 182, at 83.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 77 (“[T]he United Steelworkers have remained steadfast allies of
the NDP.”); Ken Neumann, Why We Didn't Do What Buzz Hargrove Did,
GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 31, 20015, at A15.
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In addition to likely weakening the NDP, as Larry Savage
points out, “the strategic voting approach demonstrated that
the labour movement could not speak with a unified voice, let
alone in its own voice, on the question of labour’s political vi201
sion.”
VI. CONCLUSION
John Godard’s Historical-Institutionalist and Harry Arthurs’s “Real” Constitution perspectives offer a means of interpreting historical and current RTW initiatives and assessing
whether, unlike in the past, anti-labor changes will succeed in
taking root in Canada. Should this be the case, then Canada’s
labor relations and unionization will likely come to resemble
that of the United States, marked by sharp, continued decline.
If, however, these efforts fail to establish lasting change, Canada may continue to trace its own experience with the Wagner
model.
The RTW issue is one that, especially in Canada, exists at
the tension point between the juridical and “real” constitutions,
and challenges some of the nation’s longstanding social, political, and institutional norms. It may prove to be an example of
the overwhelming power of the “real” constitution and shifts in
values and norms to define our labor law and policy. This may
be a point of historical departure for Canadian labor.
Godard is optimistic about the durability and resilience of
Canadian Historical-Institutionalist values that have deter202
mined how the Wagner model has played out in this country,
while Arthurs is more pessimistic about the overwhelming
203
power of changes in the nation’s “real” constitution. Although
labor is engaged in an array of strategic resistance, it is not
clear that it will be sufficient to once again succeed against anti-labor forces.
It would be rash to attempt to predict the outcome of these
simultaneously complex and subtle events. Godard’s optimism
may be realistic; Arthurs’s pessimism may be warranted. As
these events play out we will learn whether, despite the greater
protection offered by Canada’s juridical constitution, a lingering Red Tory influence, and labor’s resistance, the nation’s “real” constitution, institutional norms, and values have under201. Savage, supra note 182, at 79.
202. Godard, Historical-Institutionalist, supra note 3, at 415–16.
203. See Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 61–63.
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gone greater, countervailing change such that labor law will
follow.

